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Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation 





Using bootstrap panel analysis, allowing for cross-country correlation, without the need of 
pre-testing for unit roots, we study the causality between government spending and revenue 
for the EU in the period 1960-2006. We find spend-and-tax causality for Italy, France, Spain, 
Greece, and Portugal, while tax-and-spend evidence is present for Germany, Belgium, Austria 
Finland and the UK, and for several EU New Member States. Moreover, in the run-up to 
EMU there was some shifting away from a spend-and-tax strategy, implying adjustments of 
fiscal behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal sustainability studies usually assess the existence of a long-term cointegration 
relationship between government revenue and spending.
1 Nevertheless, an important feature 
linked to the existence of such cointegration relation is the direction of causality between 
spending and revenue, which conveys how fiscal policy is set-up in practice. Indeed, one may 
have one-way Granger-causality from spending (revenue) to revenue (spending), i.e. “spend-
and-tax”  (“tax-and-spend”) causality, two-way causality or no  Granger-causality between 
revenue and spending. 
The literature essentially assesses the existence of causality in a single country set-
up.
2 However, there is economic rational for undertaking a panel approach, taking advantage 
of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. In the European Union (EU), and even 
if there is no single fiscal policy in place, panel analysis is relevant in the context of countries 
seeking to pursue sound fiscal policies within the framework of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Cross-country dependence can be envisaged in the run-up to Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), via peer pressure or via integrated financial markets. Moreover, cross-country 
spillovers in government bond markets are to be expected, and interest rates comovements 
inside the EU have also gradually become more noticeable.  
This paper contributes to the literature with a bootstrap panel analysis of causality 
between government revenue and spending in the EU country set, to assess which countries 
are characterised by a tax-and-spend or by a spend-and-tax behaviour during the period 1960-
2006. Section two explains the methodology, section three reports the empirical analysis and 




We employ the panel data approach of Kónya (2006), based on a bivariate finite-order 
vector autoregressive model, and we apply it in our context to general government revenue, 
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  (1) 
where the index  i  ( ) N i ,..., 1 =  denotes the country, the index t  ( ) T t ,..., 1 =  the period, j the 
lag, and p1i, p2i and p3i, indicate the longest lags in the system. The error terms,  1,, it e  and  2,, it e , 
are supposed to be white-noises  and may be correlated with each other for a given country. 
System (1) is estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) procedure, 
since possible links may exist among individual regressions via contemporaneous correlation
4 
within  the two  equations. Wald tests for Granger causality are performed with country 
specific bootstrap critical values generated by simulations.  
                                                 
1 Afonso (2005) explains the relevant linkages and reviews the empirical evidence. Afonso and Rault (2007) test 
the cointegration relationship with panel unit root and cointegration tests, allowing for correlation within and 
between units. 
2 See, for instance, von Fursternberg et al.  (1986), Chang et al. (2002), Payne (2004), and Kollias and 
Paleologou (2006). 
3 We are grateful to L. Kónya for providing his TSP codes, which we have adapted for our analysis. 
4 A likely assumption for macroeconomic time series for EU countries, with strong economic links.   3 
With respect to system (1), in country i there is one-way Granger-causality from G to 
R if in the first equation not all 1,i g are zero but in the second all 2,i b are zero; there is one-way 
Granger-causality from R to G if in the first equation all  1,i g are zero but in the second not all 
2,i b are zero; there is two-way Granger-causality between  R to G if neither all  2,i b nor all 
1,i g are zero; and there is no Granger-causality between R to G if all  2,i b and  1,i g are zero.
5  
This procedure has several advantages. Firstly, it does not assume that the panel is 
homogeneous, being possible to test for Granger-causality on each individual panel member 
separately. However, since contemporaneous correlation is allowed across countries, it makes 
possible to exploit the extra information provided by the panel data setting. Secondly, it does 
not require pre-testing for unit roots and cointegration (since country specific bootstrap 
critical values are generated), though it still requires the specification of the lag structure. 
This is an important feature since the unit-root and cointegration tests in general suffer from 
low power, and different tests often lead to contradictory outcomes. Thirdly, this approach 
allows detecting for how many and for which members of the panel there exists one-way, 
two-way, or no Granger-causality. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
Data for general government expenditure and revenue are taken from the European 
Commission AMECO database.
6 The data cover the periods  1960-2006  for the EU15 
countries, and 1998-2006 for the EU25 countries and the unbalanced panels are used for the 
SUR analysis and Granger-causality testing.
7 The following panels are used: EU15 (Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, France,  Germany,  Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Sweden); and EU25 (EU15 countries, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). 
We use government spending and revenue data as a ratio of GDP. Apart form the fact 
that ratios of nominal magnitudes are commonly used in the international debate, it is also 
important to scale the variables for the panel approach. In addition, the bootstrap causality 
test that we use does not require unit root testing. 
Table 1 shows the results of the causality tests for the EU15 panel for the period 
1960-2006. It is possible to observe that while government revenue  positively  causes 
government spending for Germany and negatively for Ireland, there are more cases pointing 




We also compared the results (not shown) for two sub-periods, 1960-1985 and 1986-
2006. In the first sub-period, causality from revenue to spending occurs in six countries, 
while causality from spending to revenue is  detected for Greece,  Italy and Portugal. In 
addition, the tax-and-spend result is obtained for Portugal  in the second sub-period while a 
negative causality from revenue to spending is found for Italy and Belgium, which may 
                                                 
5 This implies a one period ahead causality. 
6 The AMECO codes are as follows: total expenditure (% of GDP), .1.0.319.0.UUTGE, .1.0.319.0.UUTGF; 
total revenue (% of GDP), .1.0.319.0.URTG, .1.0.319.0.URTGF. 
7 For the SUR approach to work properly, the time series dimension should be substantially larger than N, a 
condition that is only fulfilled for the EU25 over the 1998-2006 period. Therefore, for the EU25 panels the SUR 
estimation is performed on the (unbalanced) 1970-2006 period.   4 
signal increased concerns regarding fiscal behaviour in the run-up to EMU. On the other 
hand, the spend-and-tax result occurs in the second sub-period for France and Ireland. 
Table 2 reports the results for the EU25 country sample, considering most of the EU 
New Member States (NMS). The spend-and-tax result is still found for Austria, France, 
Greece, Italy, and Spain, and causality still runs from revenue to spending in the case of 
Germany and Luxembourg. On the other hand, the evidence shows causality from revenue to 
spending  in several EU New Members States: Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. Finally, two countries exhibit two-way, bi-directional causality between government 





   
4. Conclusion 
 
  We used a bootstrap panel analysis of causality  between government revenue and 
spending for the EU, which allows for contemporaneous correlation across countries and 
dispenses the need of pre-testing for unit roots. The results support the so-called spend-and-
tax causality for such countries as Italy, France, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Tax-and-spend 
evidence is present notably for Germany, Belgium, Austria Finland and the UK, and also for 
several EU New Member States. Some  changes  regarding the direction of the causality 
patterns can also be detected, after the 2
nd half of the 1980s,  notably with countries like 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, shifting away from a spend-and-tax strategy, which may imply 
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Table 1a – Causality from government revenue to spending, EU15 (1960-2006) 
 
Bootstrap critical values    Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1%  5%  10% 
Austria   0.1351    1.2361  26.5043  15.5115  11.5606 
Belgium    0.0183    0.0600  21.6994  12.7869  8.60072 
Denmark  -0.0238    0.1362  24.1007  13.7943  9.80305 
Finland   0.1050    1.6209  21.8583  13.4235  10.4536 
France  -0.0119    0.0153  33.3617  23.3719  16.5679 
Germany   0.4409    28.130***  23.0660  14.5004  9.82668 
Greece  -0.0986    1.5955  27.2009  16.9224  12.2377 
Ireland  -0.2049    11.572*  22.1834  12.5130  9.63277 
Italy   0.0003    0.0004  21.0231  16.4763  12.2038 
Luxembourg   0.2337    6.8957  21.7075  12.2952  9.19950 
Netherlands   0.1453    1.9476  21.0882  13.4699  9.83869 
Portugal   0.1810    7.7905  29.4152  20.8129  16.4777 
Spain  -0.0867    2.4448  32.6605  23.7844  17.7405 
Sweden   0.0281    0.1175  25.0536  15.5121  10.4427 
UK   0.1628    3.6575  17.4399  9.79579  7.52149 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: R does not cause G. 
 
 
Table 1b – Causality from government spending to revenue, EU15 (1960-2006)  
 
Bootstrap critical values    Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1%  5%  10% 
Austria   0.2290    8.2731*  22.2499  11.1867  7.9895 
Belgium    0.0052    0.0266  18.3643  10.5409  7.73236 
Denmark   0.1307    3.9247  23.6322  12.5703  9.37391 
Finland   0.0632    1.1145  18.9469  13.1284  9.68753 
France   0.3230    25.450***  19.3738  14.0002  10.7197 
Germany   0.1468    5.0713  18.5037  11.7241  8.79791 
Greece   0.1043    12.325*  28.6306  16.7483  11.6541 
Ireland   0.0988    6.3321  29.5567  12.8465  8.51660 
Italy   0.1363    17.783**  27.4934  16.1808  11.8194 
Luxembourg   0.0806    0.7435  20.2061  11.3574  8.39400 
Netherlands   0.0871    0.9737  19.4031  11.6964  8.71781 
Portugal   0.1075    4.9057  26.1445  15.9634  13.1014 
Spain   0.1340    10.590*  17.4415  11.5850  8.50721 
Sweden   0.1285    8.1168*  15.9548  10.9160  7.76927 
UK  -0.0434    0.3727  20.3780  10.9510  6.97039 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2a – Causality from government revenue to spending, EU25 
(1960-2006, 1998-2006 for NMS) 
 
Bootstrap critical values    Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1%  5%  10% 
Austria   0.2009     3.6305  41.2461  23.1395  16.6998 
Belgium   -0.0010    0.0020  32.2159  17.9067  13.2455 
Bulgaria   2.1296    1.9209  72.7410  18.1467  10.6635 
Czech Republic   1.1902    117.58***  60.7540  22.8137  16.6407 
Denmark  -0.0645    1.3795  41.9757  22.3520  16.6643 
Estonia   0.5861    116.77***  72.8279  24.2003  16.6886 
Finland   0.1707    6.4720  46.0596  26.9281  20.8231 
France   0.0676    0.7831  43.3779  24.2287  19.8115 
Germany   0.4764    47.753***  34.4426  23.1298  15.8835 
Greece  -0.1240    3.3001  29.8829  19.4335  14.3818 
Hungary   1.3929    13.215  133.850  33.8927  22.9206 
Ireland  -0.1863    10.846*  32.9529  16.8088  9.91600 
Italy  -0.0093    0.0406  40.0782  24.0417  18.1905 
Lithuania   0.7834    71.052***  45.0261  25.1628  17.2383 
Luxembourg   0.2527    11.364*  36.1252  17.8449  10.5813 
Latvia  -0.2954    0.8001  72.6016  26.0319  18.1718 
Malta   0.1944    0.0612  66.7247  27.0500  18.7337 
Netherlands   0.0917    1.1335  40.9455  20.3194  14.3195 
Poland   0.7741    16.350*  75.7026  29.3214  16.1523 
Portugal   0.1771    9.9942  66.3728  34.3644  24.1508 
Spain  -0.0987    3.6759  50.0771  32.0511  26.2648 
Slovakia   0.8231    91.575***  47.1513  18.5281  12.4573 
Slovenia   1.3726    0.9320  66.6083  25.8891  17.3368 
Sweden   0.0286    0.1586  34.9508  18.8386  13.6560 
UK   0.2061    6.7309  27.4755  14.3481  10.2508 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2b – Causality from government spending to revenue, EU25 
(1960-2006, 1998-2006, for NMS) 
 
Bootstrap critical values    Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1%  5%  10% 
Austria   0.2529     12.044*  19.5303  13.4184  10.2562 
Belgium    0.0224    0.54781  19.5653  13.9294  10.8562 
Bulgaria   1.6730    1.04981  42.6198  25.0232  10.3543 
Czech Republic  -0.0349    0.41078  71.0631  41.1924  28.0181 
Denmark   0.1089    3.27944  26.2961  19.5282  14.9182 
Estonia  -0.0841    2.03649  72.0515  39.0268  28.0185 
Finland   0.0329    0.42829  21.5672  13.2089  10.1670 
France   0.2434    18.0268**  21.3095  13.3523  10.4775 
Germany   0.0991    3.13249  20.9963  14.3719  10.3984 
Greece   0.1141    19.9956*  28.9023  21.6341  17.0258 
Hungary  -0.3327    0.57414  51.9562  29.3867  18.4169 
Ireland   0.1169    9.55691*  19.7658  12.5920  9.21358 
Italy   0.1159    16.4259**  22.1347  15.3167  11.6779 
Lithuania  -0.0018    0.00152  69.7456  45.8297  29.9929 
Luxembourg   0.0927    1.18539  21.8078  13.8562  10.6759 
Latvia   0.3720    0.78022  32.1787  21.9743  16.1741 
Malta   0.1615    0.09375  28.1466  17.6842  10.9345 
Netherlands   0.0557    0.48933  20.5256  14.6298  12.2631 
Poland  -0.4814    6.97142  75.3512  40.3326  28.0697 
Portugal   0.1048    7.61307  30.8244  20.4392  15.4292 
Spain   0.1273    12.0118*  25.0689  17.7928  11.3755 
Slovakia   0.1732    40.8910**  67.3608  36.4847  29.9371 
Slovenia   0.0828    0.00149  41.5854  23.4056  14.1824 
Sweden   0.1010    6.42458  18.9381  12.8071  9.37407 
UK  -0.0523    0.63520  18.1513  11.5070  8.34389 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: G does not cause R. 
 
 
Table 3 – Summary of results 
 
Revenue ￿ Spending   
Panel  D R ￿ D G 
(tax -and-spend) 
D R ￿￿G 
Spending ￿ Revenue 
(spend-and-tax) 
EU15, 1960-2006  Germany  Ireland  Austria, Italy, France, 
Spain, Greece, Sweden 
EU15, 1960-1985  Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, UK 
  Greece, Italy, Portugal 












Ireland  Slovakia, Austria, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain 
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